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STUDENT

NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MAY A STATE PROHIBIT THE DESIGNATION OF A PARTICULAR UNDERTAKER TO PERFORM
THE SERVICES REQUIRED UNDER A BURIAL ASSOCIATION
CONTRACT?
In its recent decision of Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burzal
Ass'n. v. Goodpaster,' the Kentucky Court of Appeals held to be
unconstitutional that part of a statute which prohibited the making
of a burial association contract wherein a particular undertaker or
a particular group of undertakers, was designated to perform the required services and which directed that any qualified undertaker be
permitted to do so. The Court held:
It [that portion of the act] must be deemed as an
unjustifiable interference with the constitutional right
of contract and to be an attempt to exercise arbitrary
power, which is understood to be any act which does
not accord with reason and which has no adequate determining principle. A legislative act must bear something more than a remote or fanciful relation to the
realities.'
The question thus presented is whether in this instance the Legislature exceeded its power to limit, by the exercise of its police power,
the right of contract guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution.'
the right
The Kentucky Court has defined police power as "
on the part of the legislature, or on proper occasions on the part of
the courts, to regulate, deal with, curtail, or even prohibit certain
engagements, conduct, or acts tending to suppress or injuriously
affect movements, measures or schemes in furtherance of a per3
missible and authorized public policy " However, the concept of
police power is incapable of being translated into words with exactness at any particular time. As Freund points out, the police
power is not a fixed quantity but is the expression of social, eco304 Ky 233, 200 S.W 2d 120 (1947).
'Ky. R.S. (1946) sec. 303.123.
'Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Ass'n. v. Goodpaster,
304 Ky. 233, 241-242, 200 S.W 2d 120, 125 (1947).
'"Section 1. All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: Fifth:
the right of acquiring and protecting property
Section 2. Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty
and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in
the largest majority."
Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Ass'n. v. Goodpaster,
supra, note 3 at 239, 200 S.W 2d 120, 123.
'Workmens' Compensation Board v. Abbott, 212 Ky 123, 129,
278 S.W 533, 536 (1925).
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nomic and political conditions, and as long as such conditions continue to vary of necessity defies definitive boundaries.' The classic
example of the impact of such conditions upon the thought of the
bench is the metamorphosis which the police power underwent in
the decade of 1929 to 1939.7 That the elastic concept of the police
power has been recognized by the Kentucky court, is demonstrated
by the following statement from Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers
Assn: "That all law, even Constitutional law, is not static but progressive and in step always with sound economic conditions and an
enlightened public policy, recently has come to be recognized clearly,
if it may have ever been thought otherwise, as is attested by highest
'
judicial and lay utterances. 1
Having considered the nature of the police power, it is necessary
to determine within which departmental province or provinces of
government it lies. As to this there is no conflict. The right to determine public policy is vested in the legislature subject only to the
provision that the laws enacted thereunder must have some reasonable and substantial relation to the interests of public welfare2 The
courts have the power to review such legislation to see if it lacks
such reasonable relation and to declare it unconstitutional if they
find that it does. But such is not to be construed as giving the court
license to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. As the
Court of Appeals stated in Commonwealth v. Goldberg, "Subject to
this limitation [right to determine whether violative of the Constitution], the policy of the legislation or the wisdom or the propriety
of it, is not for the judicial branch of the government to decide.
When the courts have exercised their jurisdiction in restraining the
legislature from transgressing constitutional bounds, they have
reached the limit of their control."' 0
Keeping in view the elastic concept of the police power and the
authority of the legislative and judicial departments with respect
thereto, it is appropriate to turn to the reported cases and see what
application has been given them under various factual situations
involving the right to contract.
One common instance of the exercise of the police power by the
state limiting the right to contract, is the enactment of "Blue Sky"
laws to protect persons from the purchase of worthless securities.
The Kentucky court sustained such a statute as a valid exercise of
the police power in King v. Commonwealth." With increasing m6

FREUND, POLICE POWER (1904) sec. 3.
(1938) 7 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 242, 246-247 and the material
cited therein.
201 Ky 441, 447, 257 S.W 33, 35 (1923)
9
Workmens' Compensation Board v Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278
S.W 533 (1925).
10167 Ky. 96, 105, 180 S.W 68, 72 (1915)
" 197 Ky 128, 246 S.W 162 (1922).
7Note
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dustrial expansion the concept of the police power was proportionately broadened. A workmen's compensation act was sustained by
the Kentucky Court12 and legislation prohibiting the sale of goods
by retailers under the cost of such goods when the purpose was to
undermine competition, was held to be a valid exercise of the police
power."
The business of insurance has long been regarded as one peculiarly susceptible of regulation." As was stated by the Mississippi
court, "That a state has the right to regulate the business of insurance and provide the kind and character of insurance contracts
which may be made, is beyond controversy. It is one of the most
important police powers exercised by the state."'" An early example
of a limitation on the right of an insurance company to contract is
to be found in Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Commonwealth,
wherein it was held that a prohibition against discrimination as to
the amount of insurance premiums was valid. 6 The practice of fire
insurance companies of overvaluing property and then providing hi
the insurance contract for liability only for the actual cash value if
there was total loss or for an option to rebuild, was curtailed by the
state which in the exercise of its police power for the benefit of the
policy holders required payment of the value stated in the policy.'"
A similar statute was upheld in the case of live stock insurance
policies."
Burial associations are usually held to be insurance companies
and subject to regulation as such.'6 In Kentucky such associations
have been treated as a separate class from general companies but
the court recognizes the fact that the definition of the latter is broad
' Workmens' Compensation Board v. Abbott, supra note 9.
' 3 Moore v Northern Ky Ind. Food Dealers Ass'n., 286 Ky. 24,
149 S.W 2d 755 (1941).
"Bell v. Louisville Board of Fire Underwriters, 146 Ky 841, 143
S.W 388 (1912) N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v Hardison, 199 Mass. 190, 85
N. E. 410 (1908), General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Co. v
Walker, 99 Miss. 404, 55 So. 51 (1911).
"5 General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Co. v. Walker, 99
Miss. 404, 55 So. 51 (1911).
16 113 Ky 126, 67 S.W 388 (1902). (That there was a reasonable
and substantial relation between the legislation and public welfare
cannot be questioned. If discrimination by the reduction of premiums
of favored persons were allowed, either there would be an insufficient fund to meet the obligations of the company or the premiums
paid by those not so favored were too high)
"Horn v. Atlas Assurance Society, 241 Ky. 226, 43 S.W 2d 675
(1931).
"Hartford Livestock Insurance Co. v. Gibson, 256 Ky. 338, 76
S.W 62d 17 (1934)
' Att'y Gen. v. Wichita Mut. Burial Ass'n., 73 Kan. 179, 84 Pac.
757 (1906) Renschler v State, 90 Ohio State 363, 107 N.E. 758
(1914), Oklahoma Southwestern Burial Ass'n. v. State, 135 Okla.
151, 274 Pac. 642 (1928).
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enough to include them.' Under such power the legislature had on
several occasions previous to the principal case enacted measures to
control such businesses. In Kenton d Campbell Benevolent Burial
Ass'n. v. Qusn,2 1 the court sustained a requirement that the benefits
from such policies be paid in money rather than by services, as it
was only by the payment of cash that the relatives of the assured
could be positive of receiving the decent burial provided for in the
contract, but held that a proposed contract wherein it was provided
that the association would retain the money and pay it over to the
undertaker, who was named in'the policy, was not in violation of the
requirements. Here it should be noted that the burial associations in
these cases are controlled by a group of undertakers who are those
listed as approved in the policy. A previous attempt had also been
made by the legislature to prevent the selection by the association
of the undertaker to perform. In the first Goodpaster case, legislation prohibiting any designation, differing from the legislation in
the second case only in that in the latter case any undertaker who
qualified according to the statute was authorized to perform, was
declared to be unconstitutional.' In construing a law the court does
not look to the words alone, but also to previous laws on the subject, the interpretations given them by the courts, the public policy
and "all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances
that throw intelligent light on the intention of the lawmaking
body." If this is done in interpreting the series of legislative acts
concerning burial associations, it will be seen that the purpose
throughout has been to protect the policy holders or their representatives from being placed in a position where they are unable to
bargain, but must accept the terms and services of a particular
undertaker. Under the present system the association collects the
premiums and limits the selection to one of its own number to
whom it pays the benefits. The representative of the policyholder
who is prevented from selecting on the open market and who cannot
control the payment is required to accept whatever service is offered
for the amount of the benefits or pay whatever sum is demanded to
secure the type of service desired. In the principal case the court
centered its attention on the fact that undertakers who are not members of the association would profit by the act, but it is submitted
that such benefit is incidental and that the true purpose of the act
"Newport Benevolent Burial Ass'n. v. Clay, 170 Ky. 633, 186
S.W 658 (1916).
21244 Ky 260, 50 S.W 2d 554 (1932)
1279 Ky. 92, 129 S.W 2d 1033 (1939).
'Schultz v. Ohio County, 226 Ky. 633, 637, 11 S.W 2d 702, 704
(1928).
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is that set out above and the more desirable result would have been
to have sustained it as a valid exercise of the police power'
JoHN J. HopKiNs

Another element involved in tius case was that of restraint of
trade. The court states that such must be determined under principles of common law as Kenucky has no anti-trust statutes, seemingly oblivious to the attempts of .the legislature to enact such a
statute by the one they were then construing. The court cites as controlling the dictum in Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Ass'n.
v. Quinn, 244 Ky. 260, 265-6, 50 S.W 2d 554, 556 (1932), the decision of which was rendered before the passage of this act and
Umon Labor Hospital Ass'n. v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158
Cal. 551, 112 Pac. 886 (1910), wherein no statute was involved.

